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Abstract
This brief note is meant to complement our previous comment on "The Blessings of Multiple Causes"
by Wang and Blei (2019). We provide a more succinct and transparent explanation of the fact that the
deconfounder does not control for multi-cause confounding. The argument given in Wang and Blei (2019)
makes two mistakes: (1) attempting to infer independence conditional on one variable from independence
conditional on a different, unrelated variable, and (2) attempting to infer joint independence from pairwise
independence. We give two simple counterexamples to the deconfounder claim.
We echo the sentiment, expressed by Wang and Blei (henceforth WB), that it is a privilege to be a part
of such a vigorous intellectual discussion. We were constrained by time pressure in writing our original
comment (Ogburn et al., 2019), and in the months since then we have have found a more concise, and we
hope transparent, way to explain why the deconfounder fails to control for multi-cause confounding. We
present counterexamples to Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, along with a simple explanation of the flawed reasoning in
these lemmas. (Counterexamples to Lemma 4 follow from, but are more or less obviated by, the fact that
Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 do not hold.)
Suppose we are interested in the effect of a collection of potential causes or treatments on an outcome.
The foundational claim of the "The Blessings of Multiple Causes" is that, if we can find a (latent) variable
that makes the causes mutually independent, then it suffices to control for all multi-cause confounding.
This variable is the "deconfounder" from which the proposal takes its name. This claim is incorrect. It
relies on two incorrect inferences: (1) attempting to infer independence conditional on one variable from
independence conditional on a different, unrelated variable, and (2) attempting to infer joint independence
from pairwise independence.
This claim is made formally in Lemmas 1 and 2, and in Lemma 3 which follows almost immediately from
Lemmas 1 and 2. It is described informally in Section 2.2 of WB (2019), e.g. in this passage:
Here is the punchline. If we find a factor model that captures the population distribution of
assigned causes then we have essentially discovered a variable that captures all multiple-cause
confounders. The reason is that multiple-cause confounders induce dependence among the
1
assigned causes, regardless of how they connect to the potential outcome function. Modeling
their dependence, for which we have observations, provides a way to estimate variables that
capture those confounders. This is the blessing of multiple causes.
But this is incorrect; that the causes are independent from one another conditional on Z does not imply that
the causes are collectively independent from a new variable altogether—a potential outcome—conditional
on Z.
In fact, the claim described above is a simple statement about the relationships among conditional and joint
probability distributions, and it may clarify matters to state the claim without any reference to potential
outcomes or to causality. To that end, we will use A1,A2, ... to represent the causes, W to stand in for
a potential outcome Y (a1,a2, ...), and Z to be any variable that renders the causes conditionally mutually
independent. Then the crucial, but incorrect, claim made in Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 of WB (2019) can be stated
as follows:
The Deconfounder Claim:
Assume
There existsU such that for all j1
(i) A j ⊥W |U,
(ii) A j ⊥ (A1, ...,A j−1,A j+1, ...)|U
(1)
and
(A1,A2, ...) are mutually independent given Z. (2)
Then
(A1,A2, ...)⊥W |Z. (3)
Although we have abstracted away from causality and potential outcomes here, when the As are causes
and W = Y (a1,a2, ...) is a potential outcome, (1) and (3) are important statements about confounding and
ignorability. Assumption (1) is a simplified but stronger version of WB’s "no single-cause confounding”
assumption (Definition 4 of WB, 2019).2 All of our arguments below can be conditioned on any observed
single-cause confounders. Assumption (2) is the assumption that the causes come from a factor model with
latent factor Z (see Equation 5 and Definition 2, Equation 35 in WB, 2019). The conclusion (3) is conditional
ignorability or "weak unconfoundedness;" it says that Z suffices to control for any multi-cause confounding
of the effect of (A1,A2, ...) on Y . In the absence of single-cause confounders, as we assume throughout, Z
suffices to control for all confounding and to identify causal effects.
But (3) does not follow from (1) and (2). The Deconfounder Claim is false because it attempts to infer
independence conditional on Z from independence conditional on U , and because it attempts to infer joint
1There is an additional technical requirement which we will discuss in footnotes throughout in order to simplify the main text:
(iii) No proper subset of σ(U) satisfies (ii).
We interpret this to mean that there is no random variable X measurable with respect to a proper subset of σ(U) such that (ii) holds
conditional on X instead ofU .
2The version in WB allows this to hold for a different U j for each j. We make this simplified assumption without loss of generality,
because it implies WB’s version.
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from pairwise independence. Clearly (3) does not follow from (2); you cannot learn what independences
hold in the joint distribution of (A,W,Z) from the marginal distribution of A and Z. And (1) cannot help,
becauseU may be entirely unrelated to Z. Even if we were to stipulate thatU = Z in (1), (i) is about pairwise
independence which does not imply the joint independence of (3).
In order to highlight these two inferential errors, consider the case with only two causes. Then the Decon-
founder Claim can be restated as follows:
Assume
There existsU such that3
(i) A1 ⊥W |U and A2 ⊥W |U,
(ii) A1 ⊥ A2|U
(4)
and
A1 ⊥ A2|Z. (5)
Then
(A1,A2)⊥W |Z. (6)
But (6) does not follow from (4) and (5). Because (4)(i) does not condition on Z, it does not rule out the
case that, e.g., A1 6⊥W |Z, in which case the conclusion does not hold. Even if we replacedU with Z in (4)
joint independence does not follow from pairwise independence statements such as (4) and (5). This can be
seen from the counterexample below, which is adapted from the canonical example of pairwise without joint
independence:
Counterexample 1
Z ∼ Ber(0.5),U is null (e.g. a constant).
A1,A2, andW are independent of Z, with (A1,A2,W ) =


(0,0,0) with probability 1/4,
(0,1,1) with probability 1/4,
(1,0,1) with probability 1/4,
(1,1,0) with probability 1/4.
Then
1. (i) A1 ⊥W,A2 ⊥W and (ii) A1 ⊥ A2,
4
2. A1 ⊥ A2|Z
but (A1,A2) 6⊥W |Z. 
3Plus the technical requirement that (iii) no proper subset of σ(U) satisfies (ii).
4
σ(U) is trivial and has no proper subsets, so (iii) holds trivially.
3
A peculiarity of this counterexample is that (2) holds even without conditioning on Z; in this second example
Z is required to make A1 and A2 independent. We letU = Z to show that the deconfounder claim would fail
to hold even if assumption (1) were modified to relate to Z.
Counterexample 2
U = Z ∼ Ber(0.5)
When Z = 0, (A1,A2,W ) =


(0,0,0) with probability 1/4,
(0,1,1) with probability 1/4,
(1,0,1) with probability 1/4,
(1,1,0) with probability 1/4.
When Z = 1, (A1,A2,W ) =


(0,0,0) with probability 1/4,
(0,2,1) with probability 1/4,
(2,0,1) with probability 1/4,
(2,2,0) with probability 1/4.
Then
1. (i) A1 ⊥W |Z,A2 ⊥W |Z and (ii) A1 ⊥ A2|Z
5
2. A1 ⊥ A2|Z
but (A1,A2) 6⊥W |Z. 
Requiring Z to be a deterministic function of A1,A2, ..., as is the case in WB’s factor model, does not solve
these problems. Consider a toy example with 3 causes, and let Z = f (A1,A2,A3) = A3. (This obviously has
overlap issues, but it generalizes easily to a setting, akin to Theorem 7, where Z is a function of A3,A4, ...
and we’re interested in the joint effect of A1 and A2. See Remark 3 below.) The counterexamples above still
hold, with Z = A3.
Remark 1. Methods like the deconfounder work in some settings, but rendering the causes conditionally
independent is a consequence, not a driver, of their success. Although the deconfounder claim is incorrect
as stated above and in WB (2019), e.g. in Section 2.2 and in Lemmas 1 and 2, we do not dispute the fact
that factor models can control for unmeasured confounding under additional parametric assumptions. Even
in these settings, it’s not the case that Z controls for confounding because it renders the causes conditionally
independent. In most of the settings in which methodology like the deconfounder works, unmeasured con-
founding is due to clustering or some other structure (e.g. kinship structure in GWAS) that is common to
each random variable in the collection A1,A2, ...,Y (a1,a2, ...). A factor model may control for confounding
because it captures this common structure. A (sometimes unacknowledged) assumption of these methods
is that the only source of dependence among the causes is common structure, but if there were a variable
that rendered the causes conditionally independent yet failed to capture the common structure, that variable
would not suffice to control for confounding.
5(iii) holds trivially because Z is the only conditioning event that can make (ii) hold.
4
Remark 2. Probabilistic factor models. In the examples above, there is a trivial factor model for the causes
A, as in Definition 2 of WB (2019).
Remark 3. Overlap. Many of the results in WB (2019) require an overlap assumption (Equation 6 of WB,
2019). This assumption is standard for causal inference and is often called positivity. Overlap is entirely
separate from ignorability/unconfoundedness, and is irrelevant to Lemmas 1 through 3, and also to Lemma
4. Overlap is not referenced or used in the statements or proofs of any of these lemmas. That overlap is
orthogonal to Lemmas 1 through 4, and for unconfoundedness specifically, is evident in the statement of
Theorem 7, which does not require overlap but does hinge on Lemma 3 (and therefore Lemmas 1 and 2)
and Lemma 4. Therefore, when discussing whether unconfoundedness follows from the construction of the
deconfounder, we are free to ignore overlap. That said, it is easy to modify Example 1 to meet the overlap
assumption, simply by introducing additional causes and defining Z to be one of WB’s allowable factor
models on (A3,A4,A5, ...).
Remark 4. Theorems 6 and 7. Theorem 7 relies on the Deconfounder Claim for identification, and since that
claim is incorrect, so is Theorem 7. But Theorem 6 (and possibly also Theorem 8, which we did not analyze)
is largely correct despite the fact that the proof in WB (2019) is incorrect (it relies on Lemmas 3 and 4, which
are false). This theorem holds because of the strong parametric assumptions that the confounding variable
is a clustering indicator and that the treatment effects are constant across clusters (no treatment-confounder
interaction). This is related to the literature on using mixed effects models to control for unmeasured cluster-
level confounding (Brumback et al., 2010, 2017; Goetgeluk and Vansteelandt, 2008; Imai and Kim, 2019).
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